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Equity Crowdfunding Economic
Growth in African Countries:
A Framework
Connor A. Gibbons*
ABSTRACT1
Small and medium-sized business in Africa, which are vital to the
growth of emerging African economies, have extremely limited access
to the capital needed to grow, resulting in a $330 million annual funding
gap in sub-Saharan Africa alone. The nascent financial technology of
equity crowdfunding has shown the potential to close this funding gap
by allowing international investors to invest in these African small
businesses. Although equity crowdfunding holds this promise, a number
of obstacles must be overcome for such a system to succeed. Investment
in startup companies is a speculative proposition anywhere; in
developing economies like those in Africa, the risks are amplified
significantly. Less information is available to investors, political risk
can threaten returns, and fraud protections must be put in place to
protect the investors. Therefore, a new crowdfunding-friendly
regulatory regime that borrows the successful provisions from existing
systems, combined with an international intermediary to implement
and enforce the regime should be created to facilitate foreign investment
through equity crowdfunding. This note examines the risks associated
with such an investment vehicle and proposes a framework for necessary
regulation and intermediary that would allow equity crowdfunding to
grow the emerging economies of Africa.
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1.

This Note was written prior to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic,
and due to unforeseen circumstances, its publication was delayed.
Therefore, the effects of the global health crisis on the viability of equity
crowdfunding will not be explored.
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I.

Introduction

Small and medium enterprises (“SMEs”) are the lifeblood of the
world economy. These firms, which typically employ fewer than 500
people (this number varies),2 comprise about 90% of businesses in the
world and account for more than half of global employment, according
to the World Bank.3 In developing economies, like those in Africa,
though, these businesses are even more important, contributing up to
40% gross domestic product of these countries.4 SMEs in developing
economies are responsible for seven out of every ten jobs created, and
these numbers do not even consider “informal” SMEs.5 However, these
SMEs, both formal and informal, face significant obstacles in obtaining
2.

Glossary of Statistical Terms: Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises
(SMES), ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (Dec. 2, 2005),
https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3123
[https://perma.cc/F25L-MTRM].

3.

Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) Finance, WORLD BANK GRP.,
https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/smefinance
[https://perma.cc/8ZRC-NJZB].

4.

Id.

5.

Id.
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the funding they need to grow and become profitable. The International
Finance Corporation estimates that, in developing countries, there is a
$5.2 trillion gap between the demand for capital and the supply of
capital amongst formal SMEs and a $2.9 trillion gap for informal
SMEs.6 In sub-Saharan Africa, alone, this gap exceeds $330 billion.7 In
total, 40% of all enterprises in the developing world are credit
constrained.8
Closing this funding gap for SMEs is vital to economic growth in
the developing countries of the African continent. Though startup
investment in Africa is growing rapidly,9 the businesses that need
capital the most are still largely unable to obtain it. Equity-based
crowdfunding has the potential to close this gap by opening the market
to investors around the globe and increasing the visibility of innovative
African businesses in the global market. However, there are significant
hurdles that must be overcome for this to occur. This Note will discuss
a hypothetical framework that would facilitate international equity
crowdfunding investment into these African SMEs. This framework,
though, is equally applicable to any emerging nation.

II. Current State of SME Investment in Africa
In a developed economy, there are a number of ways SMEs can
raise capital. Depending on the company’s stage of growth, it could
utilize venture or angel investment,10 private equity,11 bank debt,12 or
mezzanine debt,13 to name a few. In 2018, companies in the United
States raised over $140 billion in venture capital alone,14 and this
6.

MIRIAM BRUHN ET AL., MSME FINANCE GAP: ASSESSMENT OF
SHORTFALLS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN FINANCING MICRO, SMALL
MEDIUM ENTERPRISES IN EMERGING MARKETS IX (2017).

7.

Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) Finance, supra note 3.

8.

BRUHN ET AL., supra note 6, at X.

9.

IKBEL ACHOUR ET AL., CHI. COUNCIL ON GLOB. AFFS., AFRICA IS NOW: THE
OPPORTUNITY FOR MID-SIZED US COMPANIES 1 (2015).

10.

LUCIA CUSMANO, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., NEW
APPROACHES TO SME AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP FINANCING: BROADENING
THE RANGE OF INSTRUMENTS 77, 86 (2015).

11.

Id. at 74.

12.

Id. at 31.

13.

Id. at 66.

14.

KPMG LLP, Venture Capital Investment in the U.S. Increases to $34.2
Billion in Q4 2019, Pushing 2019 Total to $136.5 Billion—the Second
Highest Yearly VC Investment on Record: KPMG Report, PR NEWSWIRE:
CISION (Jan. 15, 2020, 12:30 PM), https://www.prnewswire.com/newsreleases/venture-capital-investment-in-the-us-increases-to-34-2-billion-in-
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number remained steady in 2019, with $136.5 billion in venture
investment.15 Though the venture capital market in Africa is growing
rapidly, the total venture expenditure on the continent was just $725
million in 201816 and $1.34 billion in 2019.17 Though impressive, this
year-over-year increase was due, mainly, to an uptick in the number of
“big-ticket” investments of greater than $5 million that went to larger
businesses that had already raised capital in the past.18 This still leaves
SMEs seeking their first investment largely unserved, as just 6% of the
companies that received investment accounted for 83% of the total
invested capital.19
The lack of traditional banking systems also disproportionally
affects SMEs in the developing economies of Africa.20 Even where
traditional banks are available, many entrepreneurs distrust banks and
instead favor cash or mobile payments and transfers.21 By choosing not
to use the banking system, entrepreneurs in Africa further exacerbate
their funding problems: cash transactions do not create a financial
track-record for the business, thus limiting the company’s ability to
acquire loans or insurance.22
Recently, a growing number of African SMEs have begun using
crowdfunding to raise money. In 2015, there were over fifty-seven active
crowdfunding platforms that raised more than $126.9 million for
African businesses.23 This increasing familiarity with this type of
q4-2019--pushing-2019-total-to-136-5-billion-the-second-highest-yearlyvc-investment-on-record-kpmg-report-300987635.html
[https://perma.cc/3GHS-2QBY].
15.

Id.

16.

Yomi Kazeem, Startup Investment in Africa Jumped to Record Levels in
2018 as Later Stage Rounds Rose, QUARTZ AFR. (Jan. 11, 2019),
https://qz.com/africa/1520173/african-startups-funding-in-2018-broke-re
cords/ [https://perma.cc/29VG-HH4X].

17.

Toby Shapshak, African Startups Raised $1.34 Billion in 2019, FORBES
(Jan. 7, 2020, 8:29 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tobyshapshak/2
020/01/07/african-startups-raised-134bn-in-2019/#57a0c4085685 [https:
//perma.cc/S8YG-XTDT].

18.

Kazeem, supra note 16.

19.

Shapshak, supra note 17.

20.

Africa: The Unbanked Continent, ELIXIRR (June 9, 2017), https://www.
elixirr.com/2017/06/africa-the-unbanked-continent/ [https://perma.cc/
NA32-TMLS].

21.

Id.

22.

Id.

23.

Andrea Ayemoba, Crowdfunding Gains Momentum in Africa, AFR. BUS.
CMTYS. (Sept. 6, 2016, 3:18 PM), https://africabusinesscommunities.com/
features/crowdfunding-gains-momentum-in-africa.html [https://perma.cc/
CP7N-RUY4].
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funding serves as the perfect backdrop for the implementation and
expansion of equity crowdfunding on a large scale.

III. What Is Crowdfunding?
The term “crowdfunding” was first used in 2006 by Michael
Sullivan, who attempted to fund his video blog using small donations
from friends and acquaintances.24 The concept, though, can be seen
throughout history. In 1884, when the American Committee for the
Statue of Liberty ran out of money to fund the construction of the
statue’s pedestal, Joseph Pulitzer launched a newspaper campaign
calling on citizens to donate what they could to complete the project.25
In six months, the campaign raised over $100,000 from more than
125,000 people.26 As illustrated by this “capital raise,” the term
crowdfunding means “the use of small amounts of capital from a large
number of individuals to finance a new business venture.”27 This process
is facilitated by crowdfunding “platforms,” which are websites that
handle the logistics of the campaigns; vet the campaign proposals (with
varying degrees of scrutiny); post the campaigns that pass the vetting
process; and handle the transfer of money from the funders to the entity
that launched the campaign.28 The first platform appeared in 2003,
when Brian Camelio launched ArtistShare29 to help musicians raise
money for production, and, since then, the number of platforms has
grown to over one thousand platforms globally.30

24.

Mark Koba, You Hear Lots About Crowdfunding, But What Is It?, CNBC
(Oct. 23, 2013, 2:55 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2013/10/23/crowdfun
ding-definition-from-cnbc.html [https://perma.cc/L55B-E9RM].

25.

Id.

26.

Id.

27.

Tim Smith, Crowdfunding, INVESTOPEDIA (May 15, 2021), https://www.
investopedia.com/terms/c/crowdfunding.asp [https://perma.cc/4CV4-H
XBK].

28.

See id.

29.

Harold Stark, Rethink Marketing: How Crowdfunding Can Supercharge
Your Campaign in 2016, FORBES (Oct 26, 2016, 8:00 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/haroldstark/2016/10/26/how-crowdfundi
ng-can-supercharge-your-campaign-in-2016/?sh=672c9da5276f
[https://perma.cc/6QFD-YGDG].

30.

Olga Okhrimenko, 8 Crowdfunding Trends You Need to Know in 2020,
JUSTCODED (Jan. 23, 2020), https://justcoded.com/blog/8-crowdfundingtrends-you-need-to-know/ [https://perma.cc/8J8E-D2U6].
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A.

Types of Crowdfunding

The mechanics of crowdfunding campaigns vary widely between
platforms, but most can be categorized into four types: donation-based,
rewards-based, lending-based, and equity-based crowdfunding.31
1.

Donation-Based

As the name implies, donation-based crowdfunding is when a large
pool of funders contribute money to a person, project, or cause with no
expectation of material or financial return or reward.32 This type of
crowdfunding is typically used to fund social causes or charities,33 but
it is also often successfully used by individuals who have suffered a
personal tragedy and hope to raise enough money to get through the
hardship.34
2.

Rewards-Based

Rewards-based crowdfunding has kicked off the crowdfunding
“craze” of the last ten years.35 Platforms such as Kickstarter36 and
Indiegogo37 have popularized this form of investment in which funders
contribute money to an entity so that the entity can bring some product
or service to market.38 Funders in rewards-based crowdfunding receive
a reward commensurate with the amount of money they contributed
(there are usually multiple “tiers” of rewards based on the contribution

31.

Evan Glustrom, Intrastate Crowdfunding in Alaska: Is There Security in
Following the Crowd?, 34 ALASKA L. REV. 293, 301 (2017).

32.

Will Kenton, Donation-Based Crowdfunding, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/donationbased-crowd-funding.a
sp [https://perma.cc/6Z5Y-8FT5].

33.

Glustrom, supra note 31, at 301.

34.

Devin Thorpe, What Is Crowdfunding?, FORBES (June 25, 2018, 5:07 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/devinthorpe/2018/06/25/what-is-crowdfu
nding/#54b15ad165c5 [https://perma.cc/ZU3E-55PD].

35.

See id.

36.

Hello: Our Mission, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/about
[https://perma.cc/UX5G-E6H8].

37.

About Us, INDIEGOGO, https://www.indiegogo.com/about/our-story
[https://perma.cc/SH9T-DASE].

38.

Thorpe, supra note 34.
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amount).39 These rewards are generally the first run of whatever
product or service they are trying to bring to market.40
In this type of crowdfunding, the fundraising business often must
set a target fundraising goal.41 If it does not raise at least that much
money during its campaign, it gets nothing, but if it raises more than
its goal, it gets to keep all of the money.42 This all-or-nothing funding
model is used by Kickstarter and many other platforms, but others, like
Indiegogo, allow businesses to choose whether or not to make their
campaigns all-or-nothing.43 The funders are not entitled to any share of
the company’s profits, residual interest, or any other right given to
owners of the company.44
Rewards-based crowdfunding is essentially a “pre-sale” of a good.
It allows companies to gauge the demand for their product without
expending a great deal of capital.45 It also serves as a marketing tool
for the companies who make listings.46 There are a number of companies
that achieved success based on a reward-based crowdfunding campaign.
One, Pebble—creators of the smart watch the Pebble Time—set
Kickstarter’s record at the time for the fastest campaign to raise $1
million (the campaign reached this milestone in forty-nine minutes) and
for the most money raised in a single campaign ($20,336,930).47
This method of capital raise, though, has its drawbacks. The vast
majority of campaigns on Kickstarter and similar platforms do not raise
39.

Creator Handbook: Building Rewards, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kick
starter.com/help/handbook/rewards [https://perma.cc/3NU8-NVMR];
See Indiegogo Help Center: How Do I Claim a Perk?, INDIEGOGO,
https://support.indiegogo.com/hc/en-us/articles/526766-How-do-I-claim
-a-Perk- [https://perma.cc/3BYT-JA5L].

40.

See Thorpe, supra note 34.

41.

Creator Handbook: Funding, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.co
m/help/handbook/funding [https://perma.cc/A5CH-CKSW].

42.

DAVID M. FREEDMAN & MATTHEW R. NUTTING, EQUITY CROWDFUNDING
FOR INVESTORS: A GUIDE TO RISKS, RETURNS, REGULATIONS, FUNDING
PORTALS, DUE DILIGENCE, AND DEAL TERMS 5–6 (2015).

43.

Id.

44.

See What Is Crowdfunding?, FUNDABLE, https://www.fundable.com/lear
n/resources/guides/crowdfunding/what-is-crowdfunding
[https://perma.cc/MG8H-727P].

45.

Karen Cahn, Crowdfunding Can Help You Gauge Demand Before You
Invest in Supply, FORBES (Feb. 20, 2018, 6:20 PM), https://www.forbes.
com/sites/karencahn/2018/02/20/its-all-about-demand-and-supply-kid/
#7b5bbec14f74 [https://perma.cc/9CPT-PRRF].

46.

See id.

47.

Hope King, Pebble Time Kickstarter Project Raised $20.3 Million, CNN:
BUS. (Mar. 27, 2015, 11:16 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2015/03/27/te
chnology/pebble-time-most-funded-kickstarter/ [https://perma.cc/8WZ9
-VAHK].
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nearly the amount of capital that was raised by Pebble.48 Further, a
failed crowdfunding campaign can have negative consequences for a
business’s prospects of obtaining venture capital funding in the future.49
3.

Debt-Based

Debt- or lending-based crowdfunding occurs when a large pool of
funders each contribute small loans to the fundraiser.50 When making
these loans, funders are offered a specific interest rate if the fundraiser
reaches its funding goal, causing the loans to pay out.51 Platforms that
offer this type of crowdfunding, like Prosper,52 for instance, set credit
ratings for each listed project based on characteristics of the
fundraiser.53 This method bypasses banks and traditional measures of
creditworthiness, so it can be useful for entrepreneurs who are just
getting off the ground and may have poor or no credit histories.54
4.

Equity-Based

Equity-based crowdfunding, like the previous three types of
crowdfunding, involves a fundraiser raising capital from a large pool of
small investors.55 As is often the case in rewards-based crowdfunding,
equity-based crowdfunding platforms often utilize the all-or-nothing
model—if the funding goal is not reached, the fundraiser gets nothing.56
In equity-based crowdfunding, unlike other crowdfunding models, the

48.

Key Crowdfunding Statistics, STARTUPS.COM (Dec. 3, 2018),
https://www.startups.com/library/expert-advice/key-crowdfundingstatistics [https://perma.cc/ZQW8-YKTR].

49.

Paolo Roma et al., Reward-Based Crowdfunding Campaigns: Informational
Value and Access to Venture Capital, 29 INFO. SYS. RES. 679, 691 (2018).

50.

Paul Belleflamme et al., The Economics of Crowdfunding Platforms, 33
INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 11, 12–13 (2015).

51.

Id. at 13.

52.

See Our Story, PROSPER, https://www.prosper.com/about
[https://perma.cc/68PY-FGBM].

53.

Belleflamme et al., supra note 50, at 13–14.

54.

See id. at 13, 18–19.

55.

See id. at 13 (explaining the crowdfunding website Crowdcube claims to
have funded over 200 campaigns for £35 million with over 146,000
investors, averaging about £240 per investor).

56.

Sarah Kenshall, Equity Crowdfunding Series #1: 5 Things You May Not
Know About Equity Crowdfunding, BURGES SALMON (Feb. 5, 2019),
https://www.burges-salmon.com/news-and-insight/legal-updates/equitycrowdfunding-series-1-5-things-you-may-not-know-about-equitycrowdfunding/ [https://perma.cc/9T7W-GQHU].
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funders, in exchange for their contribution, receive an equity stake in
the company if the company reaches its funding goal.57
Because this cutting-edge type of crowdfunding involves the sale of
securities, the issuing companies must comply with certain regulations.
In the United States, these regulations are promulgated by the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).58 The novelty of this
type of financing means that regulatory regimes governing its use are
still under development around the world,59 and some countries have
had greater success than others.60

IV. Implementing Cross-Border Equity Crowdfunding
Securities regulators around the world have been developing
regulatory regimes to govern this new type of investment vehicle.61
However, very few, if any, of these regimes are the same, and some have
led to greater success in the equity crowdfunding market than others.62
The regulations that govern these fundraising campaigns must strike a
balance between being overly liberal, which could lead to pervasive
fraud and illicit use of the system, and overly protectionist, which could
stifle the growth of the industry. These regimes must also be compatible
with one another or, ideally, uniform in order to facilitate international
crowdfunding investment.
A.

The Problem

Beyond the need for regulation that supports the equity
crowdfunding market, the issue of investor protection needs to be
addressed for international equity crowdfunding to be a viable means
of accelerating economic growth in the developing economies of Africa.
This Section discusses the problems faced by investors that must be
mitigated for the framework to be successful.

57.

Howard Marks, What Is Equity Crowdfunding?, FORBES (Dec. 19, 2018,
8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/howardmarks/2018/12/19/wha
t-is-equity-crowdfunding/?sh=1cdaec603b5d [https://perma.cc/9XJL-K4
UZ].

58.

Glustrom, supra note 31, at 301.

59.

Nathan Rose, How the World Regulates Equity Crowdfunding, REGUL.
REV. (June 26, 2019), https://www.theregreview.org/2019/06/26/rosehow-world-regulates-equity-crowdfunding/ [https://perma.cc/ZYJ2-5X6
G].

60.

See id.

61.

Id.

62.

See id.
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1.

Information Asymmetry

The first problem that must be addressed is the risk borne by the
potential investor caused by the asymmetry of information between the
company to be invested in (the target SME) and the investor.63 Without
being in company meetings with the management team, there is no way
for an individual investor to be certain that the information that he or
she has about the SME is accurate since company insiders have a
monetary incentive to exaggerate the company’s current performance
and future prospects.64 To help overcome this information asymmetry,
“reputational intermediaries” play an important role in vetting the
target SMEs.65 These institutions—including accounting firms that
audit the financial information of the companies, investment banks that
underwrite the shares, law firms that ensure compliance, and stock
exchanges that list the equity shares—serve to “vouch” for companies
that desire to sell equity shares. These institutions can be relied upon,
as the damage to their reputation caused by allowing a firm to commit
fraud would far outweigh the one-time benefit they may enjoy.66
Logically, if there are “bad” companies trying to fraudulently pass
themselves off as “good” companies that are identified by these
intermediaries, what is to prevent a “bad” intermediary? There is no
one-size-fits-all solution to this problem, but the United States has seen
success by using secondary intermediaries that vouch for the first-tier
intermediaries in the form of mandated self-regulatory organizations,
such as the requirement that investment banks be a member of the New
York Stock Exchange or the National Association of Securities
Dealers.67 The United States also has a combination of regulatory
bodies, enforcement agencies, and courts that police the whole
ecosystem.68 This system, though, is not easily replicated. Governments
must work vigilantly to prevent bad actors from infiltrating the ranks
of the intermediaries.69
This information asymmetry affects all investors more
dramatically, however, when an individual investor in the United States
is seeking to purchase equity in a target SME located in a developing
country on another continent. The information that the investor needs
63.

Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong
Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 786 (2001).

64.

Id.

65.

Id. at 787.

66.

Id.

67.

Id. at 788.

68.

Id. at 789–90. See also Elise Hansen, SEC’s 1st Crowdfunding Suit Targets
Pair of Cannabis Cos., LAW 360 (Sept. 20, 2021, 11:52 AM)
https://www.law360.com/articles/1423338 [https://perma.cc/DM57-FYDJ].

69.

Black, supra note 63, at 789.
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regarding the business’s current state and future prospects must filter
through many additional intermediaries before it reaches the investor.70
Also, other information regarding the culture, government, and
sentiment in the target SME’s country is much more difficult for the
investor to obtain.71 Cultural differences can play a large part in an
investor’s value assessment of an investment,72 and these differences are
difficult to deduce without direct contact with the culture in question.
2.

Political Risk

Political risk is a form of risk inherent in international business that
is much more difficult to define. Scholars still debate how to define
political risk, how to operationalize the concept, and even how to
measure it.73 Organizations that purport to measure such risk
algorithmically incorporate numerous variables to arrive at a political
risk “score.”74 However, most of the variables used by these companies
are only tangentially related to the actual “political risk” that the score
is seeking to uncover, and often it is unclear what risk the score is
actually measuring.75
Though there is no consensus on a precise definition, a generally
accepted definition of political risk is the risk to an investment based
on war, terrorism, civil disturbance, expropriation, breach of contract
by a government or government body, or currency inconvertibility.76
Stated differently, “political risks arise from the actions of national
governments which interfere with or prevent international business
transactions, or change the terms of agreements, or cause the
confiscation of wholly or partially foreign-owned business property.”77
The potential effects of war, terrorism, or general civil disturbance
70.

Id. at 786, 789. See also Mark Cummins et al., Addressing Information
Asymmetries in Online Peer-to-Peer Lending, in DISRUPTING FINANCE:
FINTECH AND STRATEGY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 15, 26 (2018) (explaining
that local forces, culture, language and other aspects of identity of
borrowers and lenders impact international Peer-to-Peer lending
platforms).

71.

See Arjun Bhardwaj et al., Host Country Cultural Influences on Foreign
Direct Investment, 47 MGMT. INT’L REV. 29, 30 (2007).

72.

See id. at 30.

73.

Jason Webb Yackee, Political Risk and International Investment Law, 24
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 477, 498 (2014).

74.

Id. at 483–84.

75.

Id. at 487.

76.

Political Risk Insurance, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS, https://content.nai
c.org/cipr_topics/topic_political_risk_insurance.htm [https://perma.cc
/9SSS-3H2K].

77.
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should be relatively obvious: these scenarios can lead to destroyed
assets or a total inability to conduct business.78 Also, the negative
implications for an investment if a government breaches a contract with
the investor are not difficult to imagine. The other two forms of
generally accepted political risk may not be as obvious.
Expropriation occurs when a foreign government appropriates the
assets of the investor without proper compensation.79 This is analogous
to the concept of eminent domain in the United States.80 However, in
order for property to be justly appropriated by the United States
government, fair compensation must be paid to the owner.81 In the past,
it was much more common for this form of “political risk” to be realized;
however, recently, the concern has become “creeping expropriation.”82
Creeping expropriation, also called “regulatory expropriation,”83 occurs
when a government makes incremental regulatory and legal changes,
such as changing the tax rate or restricting repatriation of profits, that
slowly erode the value of a foreign investment.84
Finally, the risk of inconvertible currency is realized when the
investor is unable to legally convert the local currency (whether in the
form of capital repayment, interest, principal, or other forms) into U.S.
dollars.85 This issue can also occur when the investor is not legally able
to extricate the U.S. dollars from the foreign country.86 Inconvertibility
can arise for a particular currency as a protection against currency
devaluation when the currency is experiencing hyperinflation; however,
it can also come about due to political motives of government officials.87
The latter is the political risk that concerns foreign investors.

78.

Id.

79.

Will Kenton, Expropriation, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.co
m/terms/e/expropriation.asp [https://perma.cc/4XPD-Z4R3].

80.

Id.

81.

Id.

82.

Yackee, supra note 73, at 487–88.

83.

Id. at 487–88.

84.

Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them:
Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L
L. 639, 664 (1998).

85.

James Chen, Inconvertible Currency, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.invest
opedia.com/terms/i/inconvertible_currency.asp [https://perma.cc/GS749877].

86.

See id.

87.

Id.
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There are organizations that sell “political risk insurance” to
investors looking to invest in foreign companies.88 However, for
individual investors seeking a small investment in a developing country,
these policies are cost-prohibitive. The insurance companies must
underwrite the investment and make their own independent assessment
of the political risk in the country and the viability of the project, both
of which are intensive and costly processes.89 One such political risk
insurance company, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, a
part of the World Bank Group, lists its underwriting fee alone at $5,000
minimum.90
3.

Enforceability

Even if the above-mentioned issues were addressed to the furthest
extent possible, there will always be wrongdoers who find ways around
the safeguards in an attempt to defraud investors. In the United States,
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 created the SEC as a watchdog
agency to police the sale of securities.91 The rules promulgated by the
SEC create standards for companies that wish to raise capital through
the sale of equity on a public stock exchange.92 Among other things,
these standards require disclosures of all information relevant to the
performance and prospects of the company (including audited financial
information), mandate the underwriting of the company’s shares by an
investment bank, and require periodic reporting on the standing of the
firm.93 These requirements were implemented to ensure full information
is given to potential investors.94
The SEC also established the liability for those who commit
securities fraud.95 These penalties may not be restricted to the issuer of
the securities alone; some state laws impose liability on the accountants,
lawyers, bankers, and others involved in the transaction for failing to

88.

Bethan Moorcraft, What is Political Risk Insurance?, INS. BUS. AM. (Mar.
18, 2019), https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/us/guides/what-ispolitical-risk-insurance-162502.aspx [https://perma.cc/W3HP-DJYB].

89.

See What We Do: Our Process, MULTILATERAL INV. GUARANTEE AGENCY,
https://www.miga.org/our-process [https://perma.cc/BA5Q-G5HR].

90.

Id.

91.

Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1934).
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SCOTT BAUGUESS ET AL., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, CAPITAL RAISING IN
THE U.S.: AN ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET FOR UNREGISTERED SECURITIES
OFFERINGS, 2009–2017, at 1, 3 (2018).

93.

See Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, INVESTOR.GOV: U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersregis3
3htm.html (last updated Sept. 2, 2011).
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See id.
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serve as effective gatekeepers.96 These penalties generally serve as an
effective deterrent of fraud.97
Further, the rules created by the SEC also allow for investors to
seek damages in court.98 In the United States, securities fraud cases
often proceed as class action suits and often result in multi-milliondollar settlements.99 These cases are very enticing to plaintiffs’
attorneys due to the potential size of the awarded damages.100
Until recently, American investors could seek damages for securities
fraud from foreign companies pursuant to Section 10b–5 of the
Securities Exchange Act, which provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of
the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.101

The case law, coming disproportionately from the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, had created two different tests to
determine if a court had jurisdiction to hear a case of extraterritorial
securities fraud: the effects test and the conduct test.102 The effects test
required that the fraudulent activity must have had sufficient effects

96.

Jennifer J. Johnson, Secondary Liability for Securities Fraud: Gatekeepers
in State Court, DEL. J. CORP. L. 463, 475–76 (2011).

97.

Id. at 507.

98.

Id. at 470.

99.

See, e.g., Alison Frankel, Securities Fraud Defendant Agrees to Pay $217.5
Million to Opt-Outs. A Portent?, REUTERS (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.
reuters.com/article/lega-us-otc-securities/securities-fraud-defendant-agrees
-to-pay-217-5-million-to-opt-outs-a-portent-idUSKCN1N32JI
[https://perma.cc/F86B-P8RK].

100. See id.
101. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2010).
102. Joshua L. Boehm, Private Securities Fraud Litigation After Morrison v.
National Australia Bank: Reconsidering a Reliance-Based Approach to
Extraterritoriality, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 249, 253–54 (2012).
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on an American investor.103 The court described the test in Bersch v.
Drexel Firestone,104 explaining that the court had subject matter
jurisdiction over fraud committed abroad if the acts “result in injury to
purchasers or sellers of those securities in whom the United States has
an interest, not where acts simply have an adverse effect on the
American economy or American investors generally.”105 Under this
interpretation of the statute, American investors who are defrauded by
foreign companies in the purchase and sale of securities would likely
have had a cause of action that could be heard by the federal courts of
the United States.106
The other construct the Second Circuit employed centered on the
conduct involved in the underlying activity that led to the fraud
occurring. The court explained that the critical factor was that
“significant conduct” in furtherance of the fraud was performed in the
United States, regardless of whether American shareholders ultimately
bore the loss.107 Opining on Congress’s lack of clarity with regard to the
scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction, Judge Friendly reasoned that
Congress must not have wanted the United States “to be used as a base
for manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export, even when
these are peddled only to foreigners.”108 Complicating matters, other
Federal Circuits could not agree on the breadth of the conduct test,
and thus, it was applied differently depending on the court.109 This
interpretation is much more fact-dependent than the effects test, but
in many cases, American investors would likely be able to bring claims
in U.S. courts under this regime.
In June 2010, both tests were explicitly overruled by the Supreme
Court of the United States. The case of Morrison v. National Australia
Bank110 is an “f-cubed” case, which means it was a claim brought by a
foreign investor in a foreign company whose shares are traded on a
foreign exchange.111 The claim was brought by Australian investors in
103. Id. at 254.
104. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975).
105. Id. at 989.
106. Id. at 992–93.
107. Boehm, supra note 102, at 255.
108. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1004 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that the
conduct test was passed and the Court had subject matter jurisdiction
because the fraudulent activity of the Bahama-based company occurred
almost entirely in the United States).
109. Boehm, supra note 102, at 256–57.
110. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
111. Simon Goldring, The End of “F-Cubed” Claims, LEXOLOGY (July 5, 2010),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=cf032c65-95a8-404c-8a98
-2c30810db574 [https://perma.cc/B5EJ-4TH4].
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National Australia Bank (“NAB”), which had acquired a Florida-based
mortgage servicer called HomeSide.112 The management of HomeSide
manipulated the financials of the company to make profitability and
prospects look very good, but three years after the acquisition, NAB
wrote down nearly $2 billion in relation to HomeSide, and thus, the
investors brought suit.113 The Supreme Court first clarified that the
extraterritorial reach of the Court was a merits question, not a question
of subject matter jurisdiction.114 The Court then went on to state that
Section 10(b) does not give a cause of action to foreign plaintiffs suing
American or foreign investors for alleged fraud relating to securities
traded on a foreign stock exchange,115 and that it only applies to
“transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic
transactions in other securities.”116 The Court reasoned that, because
Congress was silent on the extraterritorial application of the statute,
none should exist.117 This holding effectively ended “f-cubed” claims and
raised many questions about the protection of American investors.
In July 2010, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act, which
attempted to establish a version of the conduct test as the guiding
metric.118 However, since the provision was stated in terms of whether
or not the court had jurisdiction instead of in terms of the merits of the
claim, it had little effect on the precedent set by the Court in
Morrison.119
The path to redress for a fraud committed by a foreign company
that is not listed on an American exchange could now be arduous or
even impossible. The SEC does cooperate with foreign securities
regulators in order to prosecute international securities fraud,120 and in
some cases, there may be a bilateral treaty in place between the United
States and the host country which more clearly explains the

112. Boehm, supra note 102, at 257.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 258.
115. Id.
116. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 267 (2010).
117. Id. at 265.
118. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
119. Boehm, supra note 102, at 261.
120. International Enforcement Assistance, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_crossborder.shtml [https://
perma.cc/93RB-7YYB].
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enforcement of anti-fraud measures.121 This can sometimes be helpful,
but litigating the case is not always possible.
Even if an investor is able to ascertain the correct forum for his or
her claim, there still exist other barriers to redress. Individual investors
purchasing equity in highly speculative businesses in developing nations
are not likely investing a large sum of money, and, therefore, absent a
large class of claimants, the amount in controversy will likely not rise
to the level of jurisdiction for certain courts, like the federal courts of
the United States.122 If this requirement does not bar the investors
claim, though, the prospect of relatively insignificant damage awards
do little to entice plaintiffs’ attorneys who have the resources to argue
such complex cases. The damage awards ignore the exorbitant costs of
litigating internationally that the plaintiff would be forced to pay, and
which would likely far outweigh any potential award.
In order to overcome this issue and give international equity
crowdfunding investors the certainty that they will have recourse in the
case of securities fraud, the nations involved will need to create
multilateral treaties that unify the definition of fraud and the violations
that result in fraud liability. The treaties must clearly describe the
mechanisms that will be used to enforce these laws.
4.

Incentives

An investor, who can invest his or her money in United States
Treasury bills and realize a “risk-free” return of about 1.5%,123 must be
properly compensated for the greatly magnified risk of their investment
in order to be incentivized to invest in developing African countries.
This additional compensation is known as the “risk premium,” and the
risk premium expected by investors increases as the likelihood of losing
their invested capital increases.124 In startup financing, the rule of
thumb is that one third of target companies fail and return nothing,
one third return the original investment, and one third generate
121. Mark Kantor, Little Has Changed in the New U.S. Model Bilateral
Investment Treaty, 27 INT’L CTR. SETTLEMENT INV. DISPS. REV. 335, 366
(2012).
122. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (federal jurisdiction when the matter in controversy
exceeds $75,000).
123. Prior to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the rate was estimated
at 1.5%. See 3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate, FED. RSRV.
ECON. DATA, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TB3MS [https://perma.
cc/W3KH-MNCB]. By year two of the pandemic, as this Note goes to
print, it has dropped to .04%. See Eric Milstein & David Wessel, What
Did the Fed Do in Response to the COVID-19 Crisis?, BROOKINGS,
https://www.brookings.edu/research/fed-response-to-covid19/
[https://perma.cc/MH5W-RGVX].
124. Adam Hayes, Risk Premium, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.
com/terms/r/riskpremium.asp [https://perma.cc/85AQ-YDL3].
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significant returns.125 Therefore, in order for equity crowdfunding in
Africa to generate returns large enough to keep foreign investors
interested, about one third of the campaigns that are successfully
funded must succeed.126 Eventually, as the ecosystem develops and
venture capital firms target African SMEs with greater amounts of
capital, the very remote chance of a “unicorn”127 in Africa could become
a reality. Until then, though, there must be incentives to invest in
African SMEs that make the small likelihood of choosing a target
company that results in significant positive returns more palatable to
potential investors.
One such incentive is the prospect of greater portfolio
diversification, as small firms in developing countries are far removed
from the economic pressures impacting American companies, and thus,
will not be highly correlated with fluctuations impacting the American
market.128 However, efficient diversification can be achieved through
participation in only developed markets with lower risk, and further
diversification can very easily suffer from diminishing returns.129
Therefore, diversification is more often an incentive for corporations,
rather than individual investors, to make foreign investments.130
The host country can make a serious impact when it comes to such
incentives. If the government of the country is “bought-in” on the
importance of small business growth for the growth of the economy as
a whole, that government’s motivations will be aligned with foreign
investors—they both have an interest in the success and profitability
of the target SME. To leverage this motivational alignment, host
governments could offer fund matching programs, in which a
government agency pledges to match money contributed by a foreign
investor to an SME in the country. In this way, the company has a
“double” influx of capital, hopefully allowing it to grow even more
quickly, thus achieving the goals of the country and the investor.
125. Manoj Ranaweera, The 10x Return Model of VC Funding, TECHCELERATE
VENTURES (May 5, 2021), https://www.techcelerate.ventures/2018/12/
the-10x-return-model-of-vc-funding/ [https://perma.cc/K3KB-2JVN].
126. Id.
127. James Chen, Unicorn, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 29, 2021), https://www.invest
opedia.com/terms/u/unicorn.asp [https://perma.cc/TYQ3-3YK5] (defining
a “unicorn,” in venture capital parlance, as a “privately held startup company
with a value of over $1 billion”).
128. Joost Driessen & Luc Laeven, International Portfolio Diversification
Benefits: Cross-Country Evidence from a Local Perspective, 31 J. BANKING
& FIN. 1693, 1704–05 (2007).
129. Silvio J. Camilleri & Gabriella Galea, The Diversification Potential
Offered by Emerging Markets in Recent Years, 1 FAC. ECON., MGMT. &
ACCT. RSCH. BULL., no. 3, 2009, at 21, 31.
130. Jeff Madura & Ann M. Whyte, Diversification Benefits of Direct Foreign
Investment, 30 MGMT. INT’L REV. 73, 73 (1990).
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The host countries that have realized the importance of small
business growth to overall economic prosperity have also begun to
implement
other
programs
to
encourage
and
support
entrepreneurship.131 These programs include government-backed funds
that give grants and other forms of capital to startup companies.132
Also, some governments have started incubator programs in which
entrepreneurs spend a period of time with a group of experienced
investors and business owners who help them develop their business
plan and prepare their business for growth.133 Tax breaks on investment
in SMEs from the host country are also becoming a popular form of
incentive enacted by African governments.134 All of these programs
contribute to an environment that is receptive to the needs of
entrepreneurs, making investment in these African nations much more
enticing. Investors can see that the government of the host country is
also working toward the success of the target SME.
B.

Where Is African Equity Crowdfunding Today?

Today, there are hundreds of crowdfunding platforms providing
financing all over the world. In Africa, the number of such platforms is
growing rapidly; however, there are still few success stories from equity
crowdfunding platforms on the continent. For example, South Africa
has the equity crowdfunding platform Uprise.135 Africa has completed a
couple successful campaigns: Drifter Brewing Company completed a
campaign raising approximately $200,000 in 2018136 and, in 2019,
Intergreatme, a regtech startup, successfully raised over $2 million.137
131. E.g., Aubrey Hruby, Entrepreneurship Funds in Africa: Distinguishing the
Good from the Bad, CONVERSATION (Apr. 29, 2019, 6:37 AM),
http://theconversation.com/entrepreneurship-funds-in-africa-distinguishin
g-the-good-from-the-bad-115927 [https://perma.cc/8KCD-FJ4E].
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., Meghan McCormick, Africa Needs More Angel Investors, FORBES
(June 16, 2019, 7:21 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/meghanmccormi
ck/2019/06/16/africa-needs-more-angel-investors/#4b89d3922d24
[https://perma.cc/RH9B-FZF2] (describing the South African law that
makes all funds invested in small business 100% tax deductible).
135. About Us, UPRISE.AFRICA, https://uprise.africa/about-us [https://perma.cc/
GT9V-ATXZ].
136. Lebohang Thulo, Drifter Brewing Co. Reaches R3 Million Crowdfunding
Goal, SME SOUTH AFR. (May 3, 2018), https://smesouthafrica.co.za/cra
ft-beer-startup-drifter-brewing-co-reaches-r3-million-equity-crowdfunding
-goal/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2022).
137. Tom Jackson, SA Regtech Startup Intergreatme Ends Crowdfunding
Campaign After Securing $2.19m, DISRUPT AFR. (May 30, 2019),
https://disrupt-africa.com/2019/05/sa-regtech-startup-intergreatme-ends-
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As this Note goes to print, the platform has two campaigns currently
seeking funding.138
C.

The Solution?

Equity crowdfunding, given the correct regulatory framework and
system of self-governance, seems to be a viable option for capital
formation in developing countries.139 This Section will explore the
different facets of a regulatory framework to show how problems
associated with individual investors contributing capital to SMEs in
African nations can be alleviated.
1.

The International Crowdfunding Intermediary

In order for international equity crowdfunding to succeed, there
must be some form of oversight. This oversight, I propose, should be
achieved by forming a “hub-and-spoke”140 network of crowdfunding
platforms that are linked by one central intermediary. This
intermediary would be responsible for standardization of crowdfunding
campaigns; the curation of investable campaigns that are available to
international investors; the navigation of the regulatory environment in
all countries that participate; the lobbying of host governments to enact
compatible, if not uniform, crowdfunding-friendly legislation; and the
resolution of disputes between investors and the target SMEs. The
intermediary must help to ensure investor protection as well as foster
trust in crowdfunding as an investment vehicle.
The need for this intermediary in cross-border equity crowdfunding
on the African continent is already evident. The African Crowdfunding
Association (“ACfA”) was founded in 2015 by several African
crowdfunding platforms who saw the need to develop and harmonize
crowdfunding regulations on the continent.141 In 2019, the organization,
which describes itself as self-regulating,142 released the ACfA Label
Framework, which outlines the organization’s proposition for the
crowdfunding-campaign-after-securing-2-19m/ [https://perma.cc/C6RZ5TZ5].
138. Browse Investment Opportunities, UPRISE.AFRICA, https://uprise.africa/
discover/ [https://perma.cc/LQ8B-2LWH].
139. Jonathan Moed, Equity Crowdfunding: A New Model for Investing in
Africa, FORBES (Aug. 2, 2018, 5:04 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
jonathanmoed/2018/08/02/a-new-model-for-investing-in-africa/#2aa038
c83a45 [https://perma.cc/77CH-N8YC].
140. Adam Hayes, Hub and Spoke Structure, INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 20, 2021),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hub_and_spoke_structure.asp
[https://perma.cc/TVM7-WW6P].
141. What We Do, AFRICAN CROWDFUNDING ASS’N, https://africancrowd.org
/about/what-we-do/ [https://perma.cc/Z3T5-RB3E].
142. Id.

466

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law VOL. 54 (2022)
Equity Crowdfunding Economic Growth in African Countries: A Framework

implementation of pan-African crowdfunding.143 In this framework, the
ACfA plays the role of intermediary, and all participating nations cede
oversight responsibilities with regard to equity crowdfunding to the
intermediary.144 It is unclear whether this framework has garnered
support from African nations at this point. The framework described in
this Note will borrow from the ACfA Label Framework where
applicable.
2.

Who Is the Intermediary?

The
international
equity
crowdfunding
intermediary
(“Intermediary”) could either take the form of a private, for-profit
enterprise or some form of intergovernmental agency. The uncertainty
regarding the adoption of this framework, however, would limit the
feasibility of a private organization filling this role in the beginning.
This could change as the equity crowdfunding market matures and the
private company acting as Intermediary could be sure that there would
be enough participation to make a profit. If the ACfA has the required
capacity, it would be a good candidate to fill the Intermediary role
(assuming the goal is to implement international equity crowdfunding
for developing countries in Africa). This organization is well equipped
to navigate the legal regimes that exist in the African countries, as it
was formed by active crowdfunding platforms in these countries.145
Further, it is ACfA’s goal to close the funding gap for African SMEs,
which is precisely the outcome this framework seeks to reach.146
Alternatively, an international organization or agency that already
exists could spearhead this endeavor. The World Bank Group is the
best suited to take this on. Specifically, the International Finance
Corporation (“IFC”), part of the World Bank Group, would be uniquely
suited to run the Intermediary. This organization is the “largest global
development institution focused on the private sector in developing
countries,”147 and asserts that “[it] works with the private sector in
developing countries to create markets that open up opportunities for
all.”148 This seems to align perfectly with the purpose sought to be
achieved by the Intermediary.

143. ELIZABETH HOWARD & MOUHAMADOU MBENGUE, AFRICAN CROWDFUNDING
ASSOCIATION LABEL FRAMEWORK 5 (2020).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 11–12.
146. Id. at 8.
147. About IFC: Overview, INT’L FIN. CORP., https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/con
nect/corp_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/about+ifc_new
[https://perma.cc/5G9S-92PQ].
148. Partners, STARTUPLIST AFR., https://startuplist.africa/company/partners
[https://perma.cc/N87X-MB5H].
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The Intermediary would create an international platform (“Master
Platform”), which would host campaigns from its member platforms
that qualify for international investment. In this way, investors would
have a “one-stop-shop” to contribute capital to SMEs in Africa, which
would help alleviate investor concerns that there may be a “better deal”
elsewhere.
To avoid disincentivizing investor or target SME participation in
the system, the Intermediary should not charge fees to either party for
using the system. Instead, member platforms should be required to pay
an annual membership fee that is used to cover the overhead of the
Intermediary.
The Intermediary will also be responsible for working toward the
harmonization of crowdfunding laws in the countries that it operates.
While it may be possible to conduct international equity crowdfunding
between certain countries with existing laws, many of the regulatory
regimes create legal barriers to such campaigns.149 Lobbying for new
legislation in each African country that would allow such crowdfunding
campaigns would be extremely time consuming. Therefore, I argue that
the most efficient means of unifying crowdfunding laws would be for
the Intermediary to lobby the governments of African nations to cede
oversight of crowdfunding to the Intermediary, which would then
become responsible for rule-making, fraud detection, enforcement, and
dispute resolution regarding equity crowdfunding in these countries.
The ACfA’s Label Framework envisions such an arrangement.150
3.

Members

The capital required for the Intermediary to create offices around
the world would be far too great to justify given the uncertain climate
surrounding crowdfunding in many African host countries.151 Therefore,
the Intermediary will create a crowdfunding association (“Association”)
and existing and future crowdfunding platforms in Africa will apply to
become members of the Association (“Members”), creating a “hub-andspoke” system. These platforms would have a significant incentive to
join the Association, as it would open up a much larger capital market
to their platform users, allowing for larger capital raises, which would
result in larger fees paid to the platform. (In the United States, equity

149. Covington & Burling LLP, Crowdfunding in Africa: Opportunities and
Challenges, NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.natlawreview.co
m/article/crowdfunding-africa-opportunities-and-challenges
[https://perma.cc/HCH5-7BUL].
150. HOWARD & MBENGUE, supra note 143, at 11–12.
151. See id. at 9.
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crowdfunding portals charge anywhere from 5% to 12% of the amount
of capital raised.)152
The vetting process undertaken by the Intermediary begins by
setting requirements for the Members. The Intermediary must foster
trust in the campaigns available to investors, so it is important that
Members have a clean track record in uncovering and avoiding potential
fraud. Members must also have a robust user base (both investors and
issuers) and must be active for at least two years to help prevent the
failure of Members from tarnishing the reputation of the Association.
The Intermediary should also include non-equity-based crowdfunding
platforms (like Kickstarter and Indiegogo) in its membership. Including
these platforms would allow for a much larger network of Members,
thus increasing the institutional knowledge of the Association and
giving entrepreneurs who utilize the Master Platform a much larger
support network.
4.

Standardization

Investing in equity crowdfunding domestically poses a number of
risks for investors, as discussed above. When investing in companies in
developing countries, these risks are greatly magnified. The main reason
for this is the inability for investors to perform their own due diligence
on target SMEs. Most SMEs seeking funding in developing nations will
not have a website that discloses their Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (“GAAP”) compliant financial statements. Instead, investors
who wish to invest in these foreign companies must rely on the due
diligence of the Members and the Intermediary.153
To facilitate this due diligence, campaigns in the framework I
propose must be posted to the Member platforms in a standardized
format with a minimum set of disclosure documents. These documents
should include (but not be limited to): information about the officers,
directors, and owners of the issuer’s business; a description of the
issuer’s business and the intended use of the proceeds from the
campaign; a valuation of the company and supporting data; the target
fundraising amount; and a discussion of the issuer’s financial condition
and statements. These disclosures are required by the SEC for U.S.
firms seeking to take advantage of Regulation Crowdfunding (“Reg
CF”) by raising capital through equity crowdfunding.154 Members must
152. Brian Belley, Top Equity Crowdfunding Sites—Comparison for Startup
Founders (Q4-2019), CROWDWISE (Oct. 23, 2019), https://crowdwise.
org/for-founders/comparison-of-the-top-8-reg-cf-intermediaries-forstartups-q4-2019/ [https://perma.cc/L6T7-ARQT].
153. See Regulation Crowdfunding: A Small Entity Compliance Guide for
Issuers, U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/i
nfo/smallbus/secg/rccomplianceguide-051316.htm [https://perma.cc/
E984-6BFX] (explanation of required disclosures).
154. Id.
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ensure that the data posted to their platforms is accurate. These
requirements will help establish trust among investors and facilitate an
efficient vetting process for the Intermediary when it judges campaigns
for inclusion on the Master Platform.
5.

Curation

Not all crowdfunding offerings that are presented to the
Intermediary will meet the standards required to conduct an
international crowdfunding campaign. The first thing that potential
issuers must do is complete a successful crowdfunding campaign locally.
This campaign can be rewards-based, lending-based, or equity-based
campaign; however, the target SME must have successfully met its
funding goal. In the case of rewards-based and lending-based
campaigns, all rewards must have been delivered and all loans repaid,
respectively. This local campaign requirement will ensure that, at the
very least, there is a local market for the goods or services provided by
the target SMEs. It will also serve as a trial-run for the businesses,
hopefully making the large-scale, international campaign run more
smoothly.
In addition to completing a successful campaign, the Intermediary
will also go through its own due diligence process using what has been
called “social underwriting.”155 To do this, the business seeking equity
crowdfunding would be required to obtain investment from a minimum
number of family and friends; in effect, these investors would be
vouching for the trustworthiness of the issuer.
If these two requirements are fulfilled—barring other problems that
may limit a business’s chances for a successful international campaign—
the business will post its new campaign to its local Member platform,
and the Intermediary will move the campaign from the Member
platform to the Master Platform.
6.

Dispute Resolution

In the United States, equity crowdfunding faces a significant issue
when it comes to dispute resolution. If a target SME commits securities
fraud, the remedies typically available to the investor are often
ineffective.156 The amount in controversy for an individual
crowdfunding investor would be relatively insignificant, and, thus
would not demand the limited resources of the SEC.157 Further, private
actions also fail to achieve a satisfactory remedy, as the amount
155. Emily Fockler, What Is “Social Underwriting”?, KIVA (Feb. 27, 2018),
https://www.kiva.org/businesscenter/what-is-social-underwriting [https://
perma.cc/66W7-UCTW] (describing how Kiva, a non-profit lending-based
crowdfunding platform, uses social underwriting to “vet” loan requests).
156. C. Steven Bradford, Online Arbitration as a Remedy for Crowdfunding
Fraud, 45 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1165, 1168 (2018).
157. Id.
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recovered would be less than the cost of the litigation in most cases.158
Due to restrictions on the amount individual investors can contribute,
even the wealthiest crowdfunding investors may only invest $107,000
and the average investment in the early offerings under Reg CF was
just $800.159 Class-action suits would be similarly futile since the
maximum offering amount of $1.07 million is unlikely to entice classaction attorneys to take the case.160 Among early offerings, the median
target funding was just $53,000 and the mean was $110,000.161 To
overcome this issue, many crowdfunding platforms have implemented
arbitration requirements in their terms of service.162
In the case of international equity crowdfunding, though, in-person
arbitration will likely never be financially justified given the amount of
recovery possible.163 Therefore, the international crowdfunding
intermediary should implement a uniform, online arbitration system for
all Member platforms as well as investors and target SMEs. The
structure of this regime will be adapted from the system formulated by
Professor C. Steven Bradford.164
The goal of the arbitration system is to augment investors’ ability
to seek a remedy when fraud is committed,165 and therefore, the
structure of the system should be reflective of that end. First, the
required arbitration agreement between investors and issuers should be
unilateral.166 This means that the issuer should be required to arbitrate
any claims brought by its investors, but investors should not be
required to bring claims.167 Further, the agreement should not limit
investors from taking the claim to court, in the rare instance that the
recovery would make such litigation worth it.168
Second, the arbitration process should be handled completely
online. The distance between parties in international crowdfunding
could be thousands of miles, which would make in-person arbitration
cost-prohibitive in all but the most extreme cases of fraud. Handling
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1184–85.
160. Id. at 1201–02.
161. Id. at 1185.
162. Huu Nguyen et al., The Future of Dispute Resolution for Crowdfunding
Websites, 18 FINTECH L. REP. 3 (2015).
163. See Bradford, supra note 156, at 1185.
164. See id.
165. Id. at 1168.
166. Id. at 1191–92 (stating that unconscionability should not be a bar to
unilateral arbitration as it gives the advantage to the weaker party).
167. Id. at 1188.
168. Id. at 1191–92.
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the process online significantly reduces such costs and also increases the
speed of resolution.169 The fact that fraudulent transactions occur online
further bolsters the logic behind this forum.170 The ability for investors
to easily pursue a claim for fraud as easily as they invest—from home—
would also strengthen investor trust in the system.
This online arbitration process should be handled completely in
writing.171 Again, as a function of the distance between parties,
scheduling a time to teleconference between two parties on different
continents, in order to provide oral testimony, would not only be
inconvenient but also unnecessary.172 Further, though the target SMEs
in African countries will have access to the internet, they may not have
adequate bandwidth to conduct a live interaction online. Records of
wrongdoing should not be difficult to obtain, given that all
communication regarding the questioned transaction occurred online,
so digital records of every aspect of the transaction should be available
to the arbitrator.173 The parties will submit their statements in writing,
at which point the arbitrator can issue an award at his or her
convenience, without the need for live communication with the
parties.174
The arbitrators in the system should be experts in the laws
governing securities and crowdfunding.175 Each case should be assigned
to two arbitrators—one from the country of residence of each of the
parties—in order to ensure the proper application of the proper laws.
The arbitrators must also make efforts to guide the process so that all
necessary information and evidence is properly presented.176 This is a
greater issue in crowdfunding due to the general lack of sophistication
of either party (an unaccredited investor and an SME with likely no
previous experience in the sales of securities). Though the arbitrators
will already have all documents involved in the transaction, any
additional evidence required by the proceedings will likely be in the
possession of the issuer, thus disadvantaging the investor, who has the
burden of proof, unless the arbitrator actively and skillfully participates
in the process in order to ensure all relevant evidence has been
produced.177
169. Id. at 1192.
170. Id. at 1194.
171. Id.
172. See id.
173. Id. at 1194–95.
174. Id. at 1194.
175. Id. at 1195.
176. Id. at 1196.
177. Id. at 1196–97.
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Investor trust in the Intermediary can be further strengthened by
the arbitration process by ensuring that it is transparent—the
proceedings and an explanation of the outcome should be publicly
available. This serves a number of purposes: it aids in future fraud
prevention, alerts other investors of potential claims, and allows for
easier monitoring by regulatory bodies.178
Finally, aggrieved investors should have the option to consolidate
their claims with those of other investors to form what would essentially
be an “arbitration ‘class action.’”179
D.

An Example

The implementation of this framework would allow SMEs in Africa
to raise capital from a vast pool of international investors. This Section
will give an overview of the path that a fictitious African SME,
Company X, would take to avail itself of the Master Platform.
Company X has self-funded to this point, and is seeking additional
investment.
1.

Local Campaign

The first step for Company X is to submit a campaign proposal to
its local Member platform. This proposal would include information
about the officers, directors, and owners of the issuer’s business; a
description of the issuer’s business and the intended use of the proceeds
from the campaign; a valuation of the company and supporting data,
the target fundraising amount; and a discussion of the issuer’s financial
condition and statements. If the Member determines that Company X
is a viable candidate for crowdfunding, the campaign will be posted to
the Member platform.
During this campaign, the Member will support and educate
Company X by connecting the company to other entrepreneurs who
have experience in Company X’s industry as well as in crowdfunding
campaigns. At the end of the campaign, if Company X reaches its target
raise, it will receive the funds and begin to execute the plan detailed in
its campaign proposal. Company X will pay a percentage of the raised
capital to the Member as a commission for its services.
2.

Submission to the Intermediary and the Vetting Process

When Company X determines that there might be global demand
for its product, it decides it is ready to raise more money and apply to
the Intermediary to launch an international crowdfunding campaign.
This application should contain the same information that was
submitted as part of its local campaign proposal.

178. Id. at 1197–98.
179. Id. at 1199.
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The Intermediary would then communicate with the local Member
through which Company X had already completed a crowdfunding
campaign. The Member would recount its experience working with
Company X, such as whether Company X was a diligent and
upstanding business. If the Intermediary is satisfied and determines
that Company X would be a good candidate to raise money
internationally, based on the documentation provided by Company X,
then the Intermediary would begin the process of “social underwriting.”
The social underwriting process begins with a request by the
Intermediary for Company X to provide proof of investment by the
minimum number of family members and friends. When this proof is
provided, the Intermediary will vet the family members and friends to
assure legitimacy and to uncover any misgivings that these individuals
might have.
When this process is complete to the satisfaction of the
Intermediary, Company X and the local Member Platform will be
notified of Company X’s acceptance to the Master Platform. At this
time, Company X will submit a new campaign proposal to the Member
containing the documents that were approved by the Intermediary. The
Member will then produce the campaign page and send it to the
Intermediary to be posted on the Master Platform.
3.

International Campaign

The international campaign will proceed in the same manner as the
local campaign. The Intermediary will work to market the campaign to
investors on a global scale, these investors will contribute capital
through the Intermediary, and if the campaign reaches its target raise,
the Intermediary will transmit the money to Company X.
4.

Dispute Resolution

If an investor in the international campaign feels that he or she has
been defrauded by Company X, then the investor will submit his claim
to the Intermediary with all supporting documents necessary to make
his or her argument. The Intermediary will then inform Company X of
the allegation. Company X will then be required to submit a written
copy of its testimony to the Intermediary. When all documents are
received, the Intermediary will task the appropriate arbitrators to the
case and provide all the documentation.
The arbitrators will then determine if they have the appropriate
information to rule and issue an award, contacting the relevant party
directly if more information is required. The arbitrators will perform a
full analysis of the claim, asking, in writing, any questions they may
have of the parties.
When the decision is reached, the arbitrators will inform the
Intermediary, and the Intermediary will inform the parties of the
decision and enforce any remedy that the arbitrators deemed
appropriate. The ruling and award will be posted on the Intermediary’s
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website. If the arbitrators return a ruling against Company X, the
Intermediary will determine if additional penalties may be necessary.

V. Conclusion
SMEs in Africa are being constrained by a lack of capital that is
stifling the growth of African economies. This funding gap must be
closed so these SMEs can help African economies to keep up with the
skyrocketing working-age population, which is expected to require 450
million new jobs by 2035.180
International equity crowdfunding has the potential to solve this
crisis if it is properly implemented. The cooperation of all African
nations is required for this to happen, though. The implementation of
this framework, I believe, would unlock the true growth potential in the
African market and help bring economic stability to the continent.

180. WORLD ECON. F., THE AFRICA COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2017, at xiv
(2017).

475

